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Abstract	
Sometimes	secrecy	in	law	is	required	to	protect	vulnerable	witnesses	or	suppress	sensitive	
evidence.	 However,	 particularly	 since	 the	 terror	 attacks	 of	 11	 September	 2001,	
governments	 in	 liberal	 democratic	 societies	 have	 increased	 secrecy	 and	 the	 use	 of	
clandestine	 procedures	 under	 the	 pretext	 of	 safeguarding	 national	 security.	 In	 many	
instances,	 these	 developments	 have	 eroded	 civil	 liberties,	 infringed	 upon	 constitutional	
guarantees,	and	had	negative	effects	on	due	process	rights.	In	Australia,	where	individual	
rights	and	freedoms	have	only	limited	constitutional	expression,	it	is	hoped	the	doctrine	of	
representative	 and	 responsible	 government	 will	 act	 as	 sufficient	 protection	 for	 human	
rights.	Conversely,	drawing	on	examples	ranging	from	the	regulation	of	immigration	to	the	
control	 of	 serious	 organised	 crime,	 this	 article	 proposes	 that	 escalating	 secrecy	 in	 the	
current	era	has	a	corrupting	effect	on	democratic	principles	and	the	rule	of	law.	
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Introduction	
Under	certain	circumstances,	secrecy	is	accepted	as	necessary	in	law.	For	instance,	secrecy	can	
arise	in	legal	proceedings	via	the	operation	of	a	variety	of	evidential	privileges,	such	as	legal	and	
other	professional	privileges,	 as	well	as	 in	applications	 for	public	 interest	 immunity,	which,	 if	
successful,	require	the	exclusion	from	proceedings	of	material	that	courts	have	determined	would	
prejudice	the	public	interest	if	disclosed.	Secrecy	has	also	been	accepted	as	required	to	protect	
vulnerable	witnesses	and	to	safeguard	police	surveillance	operations,	although	these	factors	have	
to	be	balanced	against	disclosure	entitlements	(Martin,	Scott	Bray	and	Kumar	2015:	1).	Moreover,	
secrecy	in	law,	or	legal	secrecy,	may	assume	the	form	of	a	positive	individual	right,	such	as	in	the	
right	 to	 privacy	 vis‐à‐vis	 intensified	 state	 surveillance	 and	 corporate	 monitoring,	 as	 was	
exemplified	in	May	2014	when	the	European	Court	of	Justice	recognised	the	‘right	to	be	forgotten’,	
which	enables	people	to	request	their	removal	from	Internet	search	engine	results	(Martin,	Scott	
Bray	and	Kumar	2015:	1).	
	
Notwithstanding	situations	where	 legal	secrecy	 is	required	or	seen	as	positive,	secrecy	 in	 law	
might	manifest	more	negatively	 as,	 for	 instance,	 intruding	upon	 the	principle	 of	 open	 justice,	
through	closed	court	or	non‐publication	orders,	or	 in	the	use	of	ex	parte	evidence,	where	one	
party	produces	evidence	in	proceedings	without	giving	notice	to	the	other	party.	Moreover,	there	
are	areas	of	law—and,	indeed,	society—where	secrecy	is	seen	as	synonymous	with	corruption.	
Examples	include	the	concealment	of	historic	institutional	child	sexual	abuse	(Martin	and	Scott	
Bray	2015),	police	cover‐ups	(Scraton	2015),	and	the	operation	of	financial	secrecy	in	offshore	
banking	(Christensen	2015),	to	name	but	a	few.	Nevertheless,	secrecy	continues	to	be	regarded	
as	essential	to	the	workings	of	government	where,	for	example,	‘[t]he	principle	of	Cabinet	secrecy	
is	designed	to	allow	full	and	frank	discussion	of	policy	ideas	without	fear	of	being	held	to	account	
for	 the	mere	articulation	of	 ideas’	 (Reilly	 and	La	Forgia	2013:	144).	 Indeed,	 although	 secrecy	
seems	incompatible	with	the	idea	of	democracy,	Darius	Rejali	(2007)	argues	democracies	move	
naturally	 towards	 secret	 and	 efficient	 modes	 of	 operation,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 highly	
contested	issues,	such	as	the	use	of	torture.	That	is	because	the	political	class	believe	‘they	are	
being	watched	and	judged	by	others	in	how	well	they	respect	human	rights	and	they	believe	at	
least	a	thin	veneer	of	legitimacy	is	necessary’	(Rejali	2007:	10).	
	
Typically,	however,	 legal	secrecy	is	seen	as	negative	because	it	 is	considered	an	affront	 to	the	
separation	of	powers,	due	process,	and	the	rule	of	law,	which,	in	turn,	impacts	adversely	on	open	
justice,	 procedural	 fairness	 and	 human	 rights.	 Ultimately,	 it	 is	 argued,	 secrecy	 stands	 in	
opposition	 to	 the	values	 that	apparently	underpin	 societies	 that	are	otherwise	open,	 free	and	
democratic.	 Especially	 since	 the	 terror	 attacks	 of	 11	 September	 2001,	 commentators	 have	
observed	a	steady	‘creep’	of	secrecy	in	western	democracies,	noting	‘it	is	generally	accepted	that	
the	 recourse	 to	 sensitive	 evidence	 is	 increasing	 in	 forensic	 settings	 and	 that	 this	 trend	 has	
resulted	in	legal	anomalies	and	obscurities’	(Walker	2011:	1,	10‐11).	
	
While	legal	academics	and	others	have	expressed	concern	at	the	‘normalisation’	of	exceptional	
legal	measures,	including	increased	secrecy,	that	have	been	introduced	by	governments	across	
the	 western	 world	 since	 2001,	 politicians	 remain	 adamant	 such	 measures	 are	 necessary	 to	
protect	national	security,	even	though	they	encroach	upon	individual	rights	and	civil	liberties.	In	
this	 context,	 too,	 keeping	certain	 information	 secret	has	 come	 to	be	 regarded	as	necessary	 to	
preserve	 intelligence	 sharing	 arrangements	 and	 diplomatic	 relations	 between	 nation‐states.	
Under	the	‘control	principle’,	intelligence	belonging	to	a	foreign	government	may	not	be	disclosed	
without	 that	 government’s	permission.	This	 is	one	of	 the	 reasons	 the	British	government,	 for	
example,	has	been	 resistant	 to	disclosing	 sensitive	material	 from	other	 countries,	 such	 as	 the	
United	States	(US),	in	court	cases	involving	allegations	of	rendition	and	mistreatment	in	the	‘war	
on	 terror’	 (Martin	 2014a:	 532;	 Scott	 Bray	 and	 Martin	 2012:	 126).	 These	 claims	 also	 inform	
arguments	 that	 the	disclosure	of	 such	 information	has	potential	 to	endanger	 the	 lives	of	 field	
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agents	and	civilians,	as	well	as	posing	risks	to	national	security,	which	are	the	kinds	of	charges	
levelled	at	Julian	Assange	and	WikiLeaks,	for	instance	(see	Martin,	Scott	Bray	and	Kumar	2015).	
	
In	 light	of	these	developments	and	other	examples	discussed	below,	 this	article	proposes	that	
negative	legal	secrecy	has	a	corrupting	effect	upon	democratic	principles	and	the	rule	of	law.	In	
so	doing,	the	definition	of	corruption	used	here	extends	beyond	narrow	conceptions—such	as	the	
World	Bank	definition	of	corruption	as	‘the	abuse	of	public	office	for	private	gain’	(Whyte	2015:	
6)—to	 include	 ‘the	 distortion	 and	 subversion	 of	 the	 public	 realm	 in	 the	 service	 of	 private	
interests’	 (Beetham	2015:	42).	 In	 recent	 times,	 this	has	been	no	better	 illustrated	 than	 in	 the	
financial	crisis	of	2008	where,	as	Colin	Crouch	(2016)	says,	 ‘the	financial	 institutions	that	had	
created	 the	 crisis	were	 able	 to	 influence	public	policy	 in	 a	way	 that	protected	 their	 interests,	
pushing	the	burden	on	to	the	general	public	who	had	been	their	victims	and	who	had	to	bail	out	
the	banks	with	public	spending	cuts’.	Crouch	(2016)	has	talked	about	the	bank	bailout	and	other	
forms	of	 corruption	 in	 the	 context	 of	what	he	 terms	 ‘post‐democracy’,	which	he	defines	 as	 ‘a	
situation	where	all	the	institutions	of	democracy—elections,	changes	of	government,	free	debate,	
rule	of	 law—continue,	but	 they	become	a	charade,	because	democratic	 institutions	have	been	
surpassed	as	major	decision‐making	entities	by	small	groups	of	financial	and	political	elites’.	
	
Although	 his	 analysis	 of	 post‐democracy	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 political	 and	 corporate	 corruption,	
Crouch	(2004:	10)	nevertheless	notes	that	‘corruption	is	a	powerful	indicator	of	the	poor	health	
of	democracy,	as	 it	signals	a	political	class	which	has	become	cynical,	amoral	and	cut	off	 from	
scrutiny	and	from	the	public’.	Moreover,	he	shows	how	the	emergence	of	post‐democracy	is	a	
consequence	of	neoliberalism,	which	has	equated	democracy	‘with	limited	government	within	an	
unrestrained	 capitalist	 economy	 and	 reduced	 the	 democratic	 component	 to	 the	 holding	 of	
elections’	(Crouch	2004:	11).	David	Harvey	(2005:	19)	also	recognises	the	corruption	inherent	in	
the	neoliberal	project	‘to	re‐establish	the	conditions	for	capital	accumulation	and	to	restore	the	
power	of	economic	elites’.	For	him,	the	project	of	neoliberalism	is	achieved	by	setting	up	‘those	
military,	defence,	police,	and	legal	structures	and	functions	required	to	secure	private	property	
rights	and	to	guarantee,	by	force	if	need	be,	the	proper	functioning	of	markets’	(Harvey	2005:	2).	
	
Hence,	we	 observe	 the	 contradictory	 nature	 of	 democratic	 rights	 under	 neoliberalism,	which	
provides	 impetus	 to	 open	 government,	 transparency	 and	 freedom	 while	 strengthening	 state	
security	and	secrecy.	To	Crouch	(2004:	14),	these	developments	reached	their	‘symbolic	climax’	
on	11	September	2001,	after	which	‘there	have	been,	on	the	one	hand,	new	justifications	for	state	
secrecy	and	the	refusal	of	rights	to	scrutinise	state	activities,	and,	on	the	other,	new	rights	for	
states	 to	 spy	 on	 their	 populations	 and	 invade	 recently	won	 rights	 to	 privacy’.	 A	 fundamental	
argument	of	this	article,	therefore,	is	that	negative	forms	of	secrecy,	which	undermine	established	
legal	principles,	rights	and	guarantees,	have	a	corrupting	effect	on	the	rule	of	law	and	democratic	
values.	This	is	because,	in	the	context	of	the	operation	of	the	neoliberal	state	in	post‐democracy,	
they	 satisfy	 broadly	 the	 notion	 outlined	 earlier	 that	 corruption	 entails	 ‘the	 distortion	 and	
subversion	of	the	public	realm	in	the	service	of	private	interests’,	where	the	idea	of	the	public	
realm:	
	
…	is	more	than	simply	the	sum	of	public	offices	and	their	occupants.	It	includes	the	
idea	 that	 the	 activities	of	 government	 should	 serve	 a	 general	or	public	 interest	
rather	 than	a	set	of	private	ones,	 and	 that	 there	should	be	a	 transparent	public	
debate	to	determine	where	the	general	interest	lies.	(Beetham	2015:	42)	
	
Howie	(2016:	5)	sees	the	erosion	of	Australia’s	democracy	as	being	reflective	of	a	global	trend	of	
governments	stifling	criticism	and	restricting	civil	society.	That	has	resulted	in	a	situation	where	
‘the	Australian	government	has	increasingly	sought	to	undermine	some	of	the	institutions	that	
hold	it	accountable	and	to	sideline	our	independent	court	system	in	a	number	of	critical	areas	
including	immigration	detention	and	national	security’.	Accordingly,	this	article	begins	by	tracing	
some	of	the	more	recent	legal	incursions	into	democratic	rights	and	freedoms	in	Australia.	Many	
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of	 these	have	occurred	since	September	2001,	 including	 laws	now	criminalising	conduct	 (and	
imposing	 lengthy	prison	sentences),	where	previously	 the	same	unlawful	conduct	would	have	
less	impact	on	a	person’s	liberty.	Following	that,	the	article	looks	at	cases	of	secrecy	corrupting	
democratic	rights	and	the	rule	of	law	in	three	areas:	(i)	press	freedom;	(ii)	immigration	policy	and	
practice;	and	(iii)	the	control	of	serious	organised	crime.	Escalating	secrecy	in	these	and	other	
areas	not	only	undermines	basic	legal	rights,	but	also	erodes	democratic	values,	the	doctrine	of	
responsible	governance,	and	the	 idea	that	parliaments	should	exercise	restraint	when	making	
laws	 in	 respect	 of	 contentious	 issues.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 suggested	 attention	 should	 probably	 turn	 to	
questions	about	the	need	for	a	statutory	human	rights	instrument	or	bill	of	rights	in	Australia.	
After	 considering	 whether	 that	 would	 in	 fact	 make	 any	 difference	 to	 the	 legal	 assault	 on	
democratic	rights	and	freedoms,	the	article	concludes	by	arguing	ultimate	responsibility	lies	with	
politicians	to	guarantee	democratic	principles,	citizen	rights,	and	the	rule	of	law	so	they	do	not	
continue	to	be	undermined	by	increasing	secrecy	on	the	pretext	of	ensuring	national	security	and	
controlling	crime.	
	
Legal	incursions	into	democratic	rights	and	freedoms	
It	is	well	known	that	Australia	is	the	only	western	democratic	nation	without	a	bill	of	rights	or	
other	 legal	 instrument	 guaranteeing	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 (Charlesworth	 et	 al.	 2003:	 424).	
Moreover,	 the	 Australian	 Constitution	 (the	 Constitution)	 provides	 only	 limited	 protection	 for	
individual	 rights	 and	 freedoms.	 Some	 of	 these	 rights	 are	 express	 (for	 example,	 freedom	 of	
religion,	right	to	vote,	trial	by	jury),	while	others	are	implied	(for	example,	freedom	of	political	
communication).	The	absence	of	a	national	statutory	human	rights	instrument	in	Australia	often	
means	it	is	incumbent	upon	courts,	and	especially	on	the	High	Court,	to	determine	the	existence,	
nature	 and	 scope	 of	 rights	 and	 freedoms.	 For	 instance,	 in	 Australian	 Capital	 Territory	 v	
Commonwealth,	 the	High	Court	invalidated	Part	IIID	of	the	Broadcasting	Act	1942	(Cth),	which	
banned	political	advertising	during	elections	and	strictly	regulated	it	at	other	times.	The	Court	
found	 the	 impugned	 legislation	 contravened	 an	 implied	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 political	
communication	contained	in	the	Constitution.	The	decision	of	the	majority	of	justices	was	that	the	
Constitution	provides	for	a	system	of	representative	and	responsible	government,	and	that	the	
right	to	free	political	communication	is	an	indispensable	element	of	that	system.	In	the	later	case	
of	 Lange	 v	 Australian	 Broadcasting	 Corporation,	 the	 High	 Court	 decided	 freedom	 of	 political	
communication	could	be	implied	from	the	system	of	representative	government	provided	for	in	
the	Constitution.	
	
As	these	cases	 indicate,	 the	absence	of	a	Commonwealth	bill	of	rights	can	be	explained	by	the	
drafters’	belief	in	the	doctrine	of	representative	and	responsible	government,	which	they	thought	
would	be	sufficient	to	protect	individual	rights	and	liberties.	In	recent	times,	however,	the	fragility	
of	this	doctrine	has	been	revealed.	Legal	scholars	in	Australia	and	elsewhere	have	identified	the	
terror	 attacks	 of	 11	 September	 2001	 as	 a	 watershed	 moment	 in	 lawmaking	 insofar	 as	 ‘past	
conventions	 and	practices	 that	 lead	parliamentarians	 to	 exercise	 self‐restraint	with	 regard	 to	
democratic	 principles	 were	 put	 aside	 in	 the	 name	 of	 responding	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 terrorism’	
(Williams	2015).	
	
In	Australia,	prominent	 legal	scholar,	George	Williams,	has	 identified	350	 instances	of	current	
Commonwealth,	 state	 and	 territory	 laws	 that	 infringe	 democratic	 rights	 and	 freedoms,	 209	
(approximately	 60	 per	 cent)	 of	 which	 have	 been	 introduced	 since	 September	 2001.	 Federal	
legislation	and	laws	enacted	by	New	South	Wales	and	Queensland	parliaments	encroach	the	most	
upon	democratic	 freedom.	Not	only	have	 the	number	of	 laws	 infringing	democratic	 freedoms	
increased	but	so	too	has	their	severity:	where	legislation	previously	made	conduct	unlawful,	and	
therefore	had	a	low	impact	upon	freedoms,	more	recent	legislation	criminalises	conduct,	which	
can	also	be	subject	to	long	periods	of	imprisonment.	Williams	adds	that	the	problem	may	well	run	
much	deeper,	since	the	350	identified	instances	of	legislation	that	infringe	democratic	rights	and	
freedoms	on	the	face	of	the	law	do	not	include	infringements	that	might	occur	via	indirect	means.	
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Accordingly,	he	concludes,	‘[a]	dynamic	has	been	created	whereby	extraordinary	anti‐terrorism	
laws	have	created	new	understandings	and	precedents	that	have	made	possible	an	even	broader	
range	of	rights	infringing	legislation’	(Williams	2015).	
	
A	recent	example	demonstrates	just	how	corrupting	an	effect	on	democratic	and	legal	principles	
these	developments	may	prove	to	be	when	they	are	accompanied	by	a	ramping	up	of	‘law	and	
order’	politics.	Soon	after	seizing	power	in	2012,	the	Queensland	government,	led	by	Campbell	
Newman,	introduced	tough	measures	to	tackle	the	serious	organised	crime	of	outlaw	motorcycles	
gangs,	or	‘bikies’,	as	they	are	known	colloquially.	Among	other	things,	it	introduced	the	Vicious	
Lawless	Association	Disestablishment	Act	2013	(Qld),	section	7(1)	of	which	imposes	‘mandatory	
sentences	of	15	years’	imprisonment	in	addition	to	the	original	sentence	for	a	declared	offence	
on	a	“vicious	lawless	associate”,	such	as	a	bikie	club	member,	and	an	extra	10	years	(that	is,	25	
years	on	top	of	the	original	sentence)	for	a	vicious	lawless	associate	who	was	an	office	bearer	of	
the	relevant	association	at	the	time	or	during	the	commission	of	the	offence’	(Martin	2014a:	535).	
	
At	about	the	same	time,	and	in	anticipation	of	the	state	hosting	the	G20	summit	in	Brisbane	and	
Cairns,	 15‐16	 November	 2014,	 the	 Queensland	 government	 also	 enacted	 the	 G20	 Safety	 and	
Security	Act	2013	(Qld).	Prima	facie,	there	was	nothing	remarkable	about	this	statute	and,	in	many	
respects,	it	aped	legislation	enacted	for	the	2007	Sydney	APEC	meeting	(see	Martin	2010,	2011).	
Among	other	things,	the	Queensland	Act	provided	for:	police	searches,	including	strip	searches,	
in	security	areas	(ss	23‐25);	arrest	without	warrant,	and	detention	if	the	person	is	charged	with	
an	offence	under	another	Act	(s	79);	and	presumption	against	bail	for	those	arrested	for	assault	
of	a	police	officer,	discharging	a	missile	at	a	police	officer,	or	generally	otherwise	disrupting	the	
G20	meeting	(s	82)	(Galloway	and	Ardill	2014:	6).	What	has	disturbed	some	commentators	most	
of	all,	however,	was	the	potential	for	these	laws	to	interact	with	legislation	directed	at	bikies:	
	
If	for	example	an	otherwise	peaceful	(and	lawful)	assembly	turns	violent,	there	is	
the	possibility	for	people	to	be	charged	with	affray,	one	of	the	offences	listed	as	a	
trigger	 for	operation	of	 the	VLAD	 [Vicious	Lawless	Association	Disestablishment]	
Act.	 Carrying	 out	 such	 an	 act	with	 three	 others	 deemed	 to	 be	 participants	 in	 a	
serious	crime	then	renders	the	accused	a	participant	 in	a	criminal	organisation.	
This	would	attract	the	additional	mandatory	sentences.	(Galloway	and	Ardill	2014:	
6)	
	
Certainly,	the	Queensland	case	is	an	extreme	example,	showing	how	protest,	for	instance,	may	be	
inadvertently	criminalised	although,	as	Williams	(2015)	suggests,	this	may	be	only	one	of	many	
ways	democratic	rights	and	freedoms	could	be	infringed	indirectly.	The	situation	in	Queensland	
also	demonstrates	the	fragility	of	the	doctrine	of	representative	and	responsible	government	as	
a	safeguard	against	politicians	undermining	citizen	rights	and	liberties.	It	has	been	argued,	firstly,	
that	 the	 idea	 of	 representativeness	 is	 something	 of	 a	 misnomer	 given:	 (a)	 Queensland’s	
unicameral	 system	 (that	 is,	 no	 upper	 house	 to	 act	 as	 a	 check	 on	 power	 exercised	 by	 the	
government	and	executive	branch);	 (b)	 the	 fact	 that	 the	anti‐bikie	 laws	were	rushed	through,	
bypassing	parliamentary	committee	and	public	consultation	processes;	and	(c)	despite	 claims	
made	by	the	state’s	then	Attorney‐General	that	70	per	cent	of	Queenslanders	supported	the	new	
laws,	the	Newman	Government	secured	its	overwhelming	parliamentary	majority	with	49.66	per	
cent	of	the	overall	vote	in	the	2012	state	election	(Martin	2014a:	536‐537).	It	has	been	proposed	
the	 idea	 of	 responsible	 government	 should	 also	 not	 apply	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Queensland,	 which	
highlights	 the	 dangers	 of	 ‘overcriminalisation’	 whereby	 there	 is	 ‘an	 increased	 recourse	 to	
criminal	 law	 and	 penal	 sanctions	 to	 solve	 particular	 problems	 that	may	 be	 better	 addressed	
through	alternative	means,	such	as	increasing	state	resources	or	allocating	them	more	efficiently’	
(Martin	2014a:	537).	
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Cases	of	secrecy	corrupting	democratic	principles	and	the	rule	of	law	
This	section	examines	secrecy’s	corrupting	influence	upon	democratic	rights	and	the	rule	of	law	
in	the	three	following	areas:	(i)	freedom	of	the	press;	(ii)	immigration	policy	and	practice;	and	
(iii)	 the	 control	 of	 serious	 organised	 crime.	 First,	 infringements	 on	 press	 freedom	 have	 been	
introduced	 pursuant	 to	 amendments	 made	 in	 2014	 to	 the	 Australian	 Security	 Intelligence	
Organisation	Act	1979	(Cth),	which	prohibits	media	reporting	of	‘special	intelligence	operations’	
and	 anything	 that	 ‘relates	 to’	 them.	Williams	 (2015)	 argues	 the	 effect	 of	 this	 provision	 is	 to	
criminalise	reporting	that	may	be	in	 the	public	 interest,	since	 it	could	reveal	 incompetence	or	
wrongdoing	on	 the	part	 of	 the	authorities.	Moreover,	 similar	 offences	 exist	 for	other	 types	of	
secret	information,	such	as	when	information	of	a	controlled	operation	is	revealed.	
	
Freedom	 of	 the	 press	 has	 been	 limited	 further	 by	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Telecommunications	
(Interception	 and	 Access)	 Amendment	 (Data	 Retention)	 Act	 2015	 (Cth),	 which	 provides	 the	
executive	 with	 new	 powers	 to	 apply	 for	 ‘journalist	 information	 warrants’	 that	 can	 compel	
telecommunications	accompanies	to	surrender	the	metadata	of	 journalists	 that	may	 identify	a	
source.	Concerns	this	would	crush	investigative	journalism	in	Australia	were	soon	realised	after	
documents	obtained	under	freedom	of	information	laws	revealed	that	‘eight	stories	on	Australia’s	
immigration	policy	last	year	[2014]	were	referred	to	the	Australian	Federal	Police	for	the	purpose	
of	 “identification,	 and	 if	 appropriate,	 prosecution”	 of	 the	 persons	 responsible	 for	 leaking	 the	
information’	(Williams	2015).	
	
These	 developments	 ought	 to	 be	 set	 against	 the	 backcloth	 of	 broader	 secrecy	 surrounding	
immigration	policy	in	Australia,	as	well	as	a	tranche	of	new	offences	(and	protections)	available	
under	law	where	Australian	citizens	disclose	sensitive	government	information	(see	Hardy	and	
Williams	2014).	For	instance,	on	1	July	2015,	the	Border	Force	Act	2015	(Cth)	was	introduced.	
Controversially,	this	piece	of	legislation	imposes	up	to	two	years	imprisonment	on	employees	of	
detention	camps	who	blow	the	whistle	on	camp	conditions.	It	has	been	said	this	amounts	to	a	
deliberate	attempt	by	the	Australian	government	to	keep	secret	atrocious	conditions,	including	
sexual	 abuse	 and	 self‐harm,	 in	 offshore	 detention	 centres	 in	 Nauru	 (Editorial	 Board	 2015).	
Alternatively,	it	has	been	argued,	leaked	stories	are	useful	to	the	authorities	because	they	act	as	
a	 deterrent	 to	would‐be	 asylum	 seekers	 (McKenzie‐Murray	 2015).	However,	 notwithstanding	
government	efforts	to	cover‐up	abuse	in	offshore	detention,	information	has	slowly	filtered	out,	
including	from	health	professionals,	activists	and	former	asylum	seekers	(Martin	and	Tazreiter	
2018).	
	
Along	with	 criminalising	 whistleblowing,	 the	Border	 Force	Act	 created	 the	 Australian	 Border	
Force,	which	constituted	an	effective	melding	of	Customs	and	 Immigration	Departments,	now	
with	considerably	greater	power,	such	as	authority	to	carry	arms,	conduct	surveillance	and	detain	
people.	Vested	with	their	new	powers,	on	28	August	2015	 it	was	reported	that	armed	Border	
Force	 officials	would	be	 patrolling	 the	 centre	 of	Melbourne,	 randomly	 stopping	 and	 checking	
peoples’	visa	conditions.	As	with	similar	counterterrorism	initiatives,	Operation	Fortitude,	as	it	
was	named,	was	introduced	on	the	basis	of	ensuring	community	safety,	and	it	also	involved	the	
cooperation	 of	 police.	 These	 developments	 represent	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 process	 of	
militarisation	of	the	Department	of	Immigration,	and	its	greater	reliance	on	secrecy	(McKenzie‐
Murray	2015),	which	are	also	features	of	changes	police	forces	have	undergone	in	recent	times,	
and	particularly	 since	September	2001	 (Martin	2011).	Dehumanising	asylum	seekers	 is	a	key	
government	strategy	here	too,	as	indicated	by	restrictions	placed	on	media	reporting	of	asylum	
seeker	 stories	 (Martin	 2015a:	 314).	 And	 the	 process	 of	 dehumanisation	 continued	 with	 the	
reimagined	Department	of	 Immigration	being	headed	by	Mike	Pezzullo,	who	 formerly	ran	the	
Customs	Department.	As	one	source	put	it:	
	
I	don’t	think	Mike	Pezzullo	lets	human	consequence	get	in	the	way	[…]	He	doesn’t	
let	the	human	element	of	policy	get	in	the	way.	Pezzullo	comes	from	Customs	–	he’s	
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dealt	with	inanimate	things.	Containers,	mail,	suitcases,	drugs.	It’s	not	humans.	It’s	
not	 issues	 of	 settlement,	 integration,	 support.	Mike’s	not	 alone	 in	 this.	Many	 in	
Customs	are	desensitised.	(quoted	in	McKenzie‐Murray	2015)	
	
Contrast	this	to	Reilly	and	La	Forgia’s	(2013)	analysis	of	the	secret	‘enhanced	screening’	of	asylum	
seekers	by	Commonwealth	officers	working	for	what	was	then	the	Department	of	Immigration	
and	Citizenship.	They	argue	a	very	heavy	burden	is	placed	on	individual	Commonwealth	officers	
who	‘decide	to	return	a	person	to	their	country	of	origin	without	hearing	their	whole	story	and	
thus	potentially	returning	them	to	a	place	of	great	danger	to	them’	(Reilly	and	La	Forgia	2013:	
143).	While	 challenges	 to	 administrative	 decisions	 depersonalise	 individual	 decision	makers,	
Reilly	and	La	Forgia	argue,	in	the	context	of	pre‐screening,	Commonwealth	officers	should	not	be	
regarded	simply	as	bureaucrats.	Rather,	they	are	moral	human	beings	who	‘actually	have	to	make	
almost	unbearable	decisions	about	the	fate	of	people	arriving	at	the	border	to	screen	them	in	or	
to	screen	them	out	through	asking	questions	that	are	designed	to	avoid	receiving	inconvenient	
answers’	(Reilly	and	La	Forgia	2013:	145).	
	
Reilly	and	La	Forgia	(2013:	144)	draw	on	democratic	theory	to	argue	that	these	new	informal	and	
secretive	 screening	 processes	 that	 have	 been	 used	 in	 Australia	 since	 27	 October	 2012	 are	
contrary	 to	 notions	 of	 democratic	 deliberation,	which	 require	 issues	 be	discussed	 publicly	 to	
ensure	 ‘our	 mutual	 interaction	 and	 influence	 over	 each	 other’.	 Although	 democracies	 tend	
towards	secrecy	in	relation	to	highly	contentious	issues,	such	as	the	treatment	of	asylum	seekers,	
this	‘loss	of	publicity	is	a	profound	loss	of	relationship	with	those	with	whom	we	share	the	polity	
and	with	those	who	wish	to	join	it’	(Reilly	and	La	Forgia	2013:	144).	Moreover,	by	outsourcing	
our	democratic	angst	to	Commonwealth	officers,	argue	Reilly	and	La	Forgia	(2013:	145),	we	are	
asking	 those	 individuals	 ‘to	 bear	 our	 democratic	 responsibility	 for	 the	 making	 of	 difficult	
judgments’.	
	
Legal	scholars	and	commentators	have	been	quick	to	show	how	these	developments	highlight	the	
contradictory	 nature	 of	 contemporary	 Australian	 democracy.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 secrecy	
surrounding	immigration	policy	in	Australia,	and,	in	particular,	provisions	of	the	Border	Force	Act	
that	 impose	 jail	 sentences	 on	 workers	 of	 offshore	 detention	 centres	 who	 speak	 out	 about	
conditions,	president	of	the	Human	Rights	Commission,	Gillian	Triggs,	has	said	this	is	‘worrying	
in	a	modern	democracy’,	adding,	‘I	do	find	it	rather	curious	that	a	government	that	in	fact	came	
into	office	promoting	rights	to	freedom	of	speech	has	in	fact	diminished	that	freedom	piece	by	
piece;	whether	it’s	in	relation	to	counterterrorism	laws,	but	we’ve	now	got	them	in	relation	to	
managing	the	detention	centres’	(Medhora	2015).	
	
Here,	Triggs	gestures	to	what,	in	the	literature,	is	termed,	‘seepage’,	whereby	extraordinary	legal	
measures	 introduced	 after	 September	 2001	 have	 gradually	 crept	 into	 other	 areas	 of	 law	 and	
policy	beyond	the	counterterrorism	context	(Martin	2012:	191,	209).	Williams	(2015)	too	talks	
of	 threats	 posed	 to	 Australian	 democracy	 by	 seepage	 from	 anti‐terror	 measures,	 as	 well	 as	
pointing	to	the	contradictions	inherent	in	statements	made	by	politicians	who,	on	the	one	hand,	
claim	to	value	freedom	by,	for	instance,	proposing	to	repeal	laws	proscribing	offensive	behaviour	
on	the	basis	of	race,	colour	or	national	or	ethnic	origin	while,	on	the	other	hand,	they	introduce	
more	and	more	laws	that	effectively	diminish	established	rights	and	freedoms.	
	
Another	 area	 of	 law	 and	 government	 policy	 that	 has	 been	 affected	 by	 seepage	 from	 the	
counterterrorism	 context	 is	 the	 control	 of	 serious	 organised	 crime	 allegedly	 committed	 by	
members	 of	 bikie	 gangs.	 Accordingly,	 state	 and	 territory	 governments	 in	 Australia	 have	
introduced	‘anti‐bikie’	legislation	as	part	of	a	wider	‘law	and	order’	drive,	although	this	has	not	
been	without	its	challenges,	including	constitutional	challenges	in	the	High	Court.	For	the	most	
part,	the	High	Court	has	relied	on	the	doctrine	in	Kable	v	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	(NSW)	
(Kable)	when	deciding	on	 the	constitutional	validity	of	 legislation	providing	 for	 the	control	of	
criminal	organisations.	The	principle	identified	in	Kable	is	that	‘a	State	legislature	cannot	confer	
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upon	a	State	court	a	function	which	substantially	impairs	its	institutional	integrity,	and	which	is	
therefore	 incompatible	with	 its	 role,	 under	 Chapter	 III	 of	 the	 Constitution,	 as	 a	 repository	 of	
federal	jurisdiction	and	as	a	part	of	the	integrated	Australian	court	system’.1	
	
The	doctrine	in	Kable	was	applied	in	South	Australia	v	Totani,	where	a	majority	of	the	High	Court	
of	Australia	held	 that	 s	41(1)	of	 the	Serious	and	Organised	Crime	 (Control)	Act	2008	 (SA)	was	
invalid	 ‘because	 it	 authorised	 the	 Executive	 to	 enlist	 the	Magistrates	 Court	 to	 implement	 the	
decisions	 of	 the	 Executive	 in	 a	 manner	 repugnant	 to	 or	 inconsistent	 with	 its	 continued	
institutional	integrity’.2	In	Wainohu	v	New	South	Wales,	a	majority	of	the	High	Court	again	applied	
the	Kable	principle	 to	decide	the	Crimes	(Criminal	Organisations	Control)	Act	2009	 (NSW)	was	
invalid	‘because	it	exempted	eligible	judges	from	any	duty	to	give	reasons	in	connection	with	the	
making	or	revocation	of	a	declaration	of	an	organisation	as	a	declared	organisation’.3	
	
The	only	time	when	the	High	Court	has	struck	down	a	claim	for	constitutional	invalidity	was	in	
the	case	of	Assistant	Commissioner	Condon	v	Pompano	Pty	Ltd	(Pompano).	Here,	six	justices	of	the	
High	Court	unanimously	held	that	provisions	of	the	Criminal	Organisation	Act	2009	(Qld)	relating	
to	 ‘criminal	 intelligence’	 relied	 upon	 to	 declare	 a	 ‘criminal	 organisation’	 do	 not	 impair	 the	
essential	and	defining	characteristics	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Queensland	so	as	to	transgress	the	
limitations	 on	 state	 legislative	 power	 derived	 from	 Chapter	 III	 of	 the	Australian	 Constitution	
(Martin	2014a:	502).	Rather	than	applying	the	principle	in	Kable,	however,	in	Pompano,	the	High	
Court	followed	its	own	‘jurisprudence	of	secrecy’	(Martin	2012),	affirming	the	previous	decisions	
of	Gypsy	 Jokers	Motorcycle	Club	 Inc	v	Commissioner	of	Police	and	K‐Generation	Pty	Ltd	v	Liquor	
Licensing	 Court.	 In	 those	 cases,	 the	 High	 Court	 resolved	 the	 tension	 between	 reliance	 upon	
criminal	intelligence	and	fair	trial	principles	in	favour	of	secrecy	on	the	condition	courts	retain	
discretion	to	independently	assess	classified	information	(Martin	2014a:	503).	Steven	Churches	
(2010:	20;	emphasis	in	original)	refers	to	this	approach	as	‘curial	fairness’,	which,	he	says,	has	
emerged	in	recent	times	to	replace	the	requirements	of	procedural	fairness,	whereby	‘evidence	
that	 formerly	would	not	have	been	available	 to	 the	affected	party,	pursuant	 to	public	 interest	
immunity,	on	which	basis	it	was	not	utilised	by	the	court,	may	now	still	not	be	available	to	the	
affected	party	but	can	be	used	by	the	court’	(see	also	Martin	2014b).	
	
The	judicial	use	of	secret	evidence	not	only	has	a	corrupting	effect	on	the	rule	of	law	but	also,	in	
turn,	 upon	 democratic	 principles;	 that	 is	 because	 both	 courts	 and	 parliaments	 have	 some	
discretion	 to	make	 law	 although,	 in	 democracies	 like	Australia,	 the	 doctrine	of	 parliamentary	
sovereignty	means	ultimate	authority	lies	with	elected	representatives	rather	than	members	of	
the	judiciary.	Another	part	of	the	equation,	here,	is	the	doctrine	of	representative	and	responsible	
government,	which,	as	discussed	earlier,	is	a	lynchpin	of	Australian	constitutionalism.	However,	
this	increasingly	appears	an	impotent	deterrent	to	politicians	intent	on	winning	the	race	to	the	
bottom	in	 ‘law	and	order	auctions’,	which	is	all	the	more	reason	for	 ‘parliaments	[to]	exercise	
restraint	in	the	current	era	to	prevent	the	further	erosion	of	civil	liberties	and	human	rights	and	
damage	to	the	rule	of	law	and	democratic	values	caused	by	the	normalisation	of	extraordinary	
measures’	(Martin	2012:	196).	
	
According	 to	 these	 arguments,	 the	 use	 of	 criminal	 intelligence	 provided	 for	 under	 control	 of	
criminal	 organisations	 legislation,	 and	 indeed	 similar	 laws,	 poses	 a	 challenge	 not	 only	 to	
principles	of	fairness	under	the	rule	of	law	but	also	to	democratic	accountability.	Looking	mainly	
at	transactional	relationships	in	private	and	commercial	law,	like	those	involving	trade	secrets,	
for	example,	Scheppele	(1988)	draws	a	distinction	between	‘deep	secrets’	and	‘shallow	secrets’.	
While	the	former	refers	to	a	situation	in	which	the	‘target’	of	a	secret	is	‘completely	in	the	dark,	
never	imagining	that	relevant	information	might	be	had’	(Scheppele	1988:	21),	the	latter	refers	
to	 a	 situation	 in	which	 the	 target	 ‘has	 at	 least	 some	 shadowy	 sense’	 they	 are	not	 privy	 to	 all	
information	(Scheppele	1988:	76).	Although	Scheppele’s	analysis	does	not	extend	to	state	secrets	
and,	therefore,	the	impact	of	such	secrecy	on	democratic	values	per	se,	this	aspect	of	secrecy	is	
explored	 by	 Gutmann	 and	 Thompson	 (1996:	 121‐123),	 who	 argue,	 ‘deep	 secrets	 present	
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obstacles	 to	 public	 scrutiny	 because	 they	 are	 utterly	 hidden	 from	 citizens,	 whereas	 shallow	
secrets	 at	 least	 allow	 citizens	 the	 ability	 to	 respond	 to	 and	 challenge	 secret‐keepers’	 (Martin	
2014a:	 520).	 Regardless	 of	 the	 public	 law	 or	 private	 law	 context,	 however,	 deep	 secrets	 are	
generally	seen	as	problematic:	
	
Just	as	deep	secrets	present	a	contractarian	problem	for	Scheppele	because	they	
impair	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 individual	 to	 exercise	meaningful	 choice,	 undermining	
values	 such	 as	 fairness	 and	 autonomy,	 they	 present	 a	 democratic	 problem	 for	
Gutmann	and	Thompson	because	they	impair	the	ability	of	the	citizenry	to	exercise	
meaningful	oversight.	(Pozen	2010:	264)	
	
Although	there	is	no	bright	line	separating	deep	and	shallow	secrets,	which	exist	along	a	‘depth	
continuum’	(Pozen	2010:	274),	it	has	been	argued	the	use	of	criminal	intelligence	in	Australian	
courts	 is	 probably	 more	 akin	 to	 a	 deep	 secret	 than	 a	 shallow	 secret,	 ‘because	 even	 though	
respondents	know	a	clandestine	process	is	at	work	(i.e.,	a	special	closed	hearing	to	determine	an	
application	to	declare	criminal	 intelligence),	since	they	and	their	representatives	are	excluded	
from	that	process,	 they	are	unable	 to	challenge	 information	 therein	disclosed’	 (Martin	2014a:	
521).	
	
Of	course,	Australian	jurisdictions	are	not	alone	in	providing	for	the	increased	use	of	secrecy	in	
curial	 settings.	 Similar	 criticisms	of	 secret	procedures	have	been	made	 in	English	 court	 cases	
involving	allegations	of	torture	at	‘dark	sites’	like	Guantanamo	Bay.	For	instance,	in	Mohamed	(No	
2),	United	Kingdom	(UK)	Foreign	 Secretary,	David	Miliband,	made	a	public	 interest	 immunity	
application	 on	 the	 basis	 disclosure	 of	 government	 documents	 and	 information,	 which	 had	
originated	 in	 the	 US,	 pertaining	 to	Mohamed’s	 detention,	 rendition,	 and	maltreatment	would	
threaten	 intelligence	sharing	between	the	two	countries,	and	ultimately	endanger	 lives.	While	
British	courts	have	often	deferred	to	the	executive	on	matters	of	national	security,	in	this	case	the	
Divisional	Court	questioned	why	‘a	democracy	governed	by	the	rule	of	law	would	expect	a	court	
in	another	democracy	to	suppress	a	summary	of	the	evidence	contained	in	reports	by	 its	own	
officials	[...]	where	the	evidence	was	relevant	to	allegations	of	torture	[…]	politically	embarrassing	
though	it	might	be’.4	In	addition,	the	Court	opined,	‘the	requirements	of	open	justice,	the	rule	of	
law	and	democratic	accountability	demonstrate	the	very	considerable	public	interest	in	making	
the	 redacted	 paragraphs	 public,	 particularly	 given	 the	 constitutional	 importance	 of	 the	
prohibition	against	torture’.5	Although	the	facts	in	that	case	were	limited	to	matters	of	rendition	
and	mistreatment	amounting	to	torture,	the	same	basic	principles	apply	to	other	cases	involving	
state	secrecy,	and,	in	this	sense,	 ‘Mohamed	(No	2)	provides	a	cautionary	tale	not	only	as	to	the	
dangers	of	allowing	closed	hearings	and	redacted	summaries	of	secret	material,	but	also	of	courts	
seeming	to	accept	uncritically	the	word	of	members	of	the	executive’	(Martin	2014a:	533).	
	
Will	a	bill	of	rights	make	a	difference?	
Debates	in	Australia	about	the	need	for	a	statutory	human	rights	instrument	or	bill	of	rights	would	
seem	highly	pertinent	given	the	emergence	of	‘curial	fairness’	where	it	is	at	a	court’s	discretion	to	
adjudicate	 on	 certain	matters	 of	 due	process,	 rather	 than	upholding	 established	principles	 of	
procedural	fairness.	Arguably,	that	need	is	all	the	more	pressing	in	an	era	when	politicians	tend	
increasingly	 to	depart	 from	the	principles	of	 restraint	and	responsible	government	 in	making	
policy	and	legislating	on	populist	‘law	and	order’	issues.	
	
In	 lieu	 of	 a	 federal	 bill	 of	 rights,	 the	 Australian	 government	 has	 enacted	 the	 Human	 Rights	
(Parliamentary	Scrutiny)	Act	2011	(Cth),	although,	according	to	Williams	(2015),	 there	 is	 little	
evidence	 that	 has	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 in	 preventing	 or	 dissuading	 parliaments	 from	
introducing	 laws	 that	 infringe	 basic	 democratic	 rights.	 Some	 states	 and	 territories	 have	 also	
enacted	 laws	to	protect	human	rights.	Both	Victoria	and	the	Australian	Capital	Territory	have	
enacted	human	rights	legislation,	but	here	human	rights	are	not	regarded	as	absolute,	and	‘are	
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subject	 to	 such	 reasonable	 limits	 as	 can	 be	 demonstrably	 justified	 in	 a	 free	 and	 democratic	
society’	(Gotsis	2015:	v).	
	
The	absence	of	a	Commonwealth	bill	of	rights	frequently	causes	commentators	to	ask	whether	
having	one	would	actually	make	any	difference	in	providing	adequate	protection	for	individual	
rights	 and	 freedoms	 in	 Australia.	 Sometimes	 this	 has	 led	 legal	 scholars	 in	 particular	 to	 test	
whether	current	legislation	would	conform	to	a	statutory	human	rights	framework,	such	as	the	
European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(ECHR).	Most	often,	this	has	involved	interrogating	legal	
measures	introduced	since	September	2001.	
	
Using	the	example	of	control	order	regimes,	which,	as	mentioned	earlier,	may	require	the	use	of	
secret	criminal	intelligence	in	closed	hearings,	Kieran	Hardy	(2011)	has	examined	the	effect	that	
a	 statutory	 bill	 of	 rights	 might	 have	 on	 the	 judicial	 interpretation	 of	 rights‐infringing	
counterterrorism	 legislation.	He	 shows	how,	 on	 questions	 of	 deprivation	 of	 liberty	which	 are	
thrown	up	when	 applications	 for	 control	 orders	 are	made,	UK	 courts	have	 consistently	 given	
substantial	weight	to	notions	of	 liberty	under	Article	5	of	the	ECHR,	 implemented	through	the	
Human	Rights	Act	1998	(UK).	Accordingly,	they	have	concluded	there	are	no	bright	lines	between	
preventative	restraints	on	 liberty,	 such	as	 those	contained	 in	control	orders,	and	detention	 in	
state	custody.	In	Australia,	by	contrast,	the	High	Court	has	determined	the	restrictions	imposed	
in	a	control	order	are	conceptually	distinct	from	detention	in	state	custody.	
	
Although	this	reasoning	may	be	formally	correct,	according	to	Hardy	(2011:	6),	it	is	also	indicative	
of	 ‘an	 increasingly	 doubtful	 belief	 that	 informal	 human	 rights	 mechanisms	 (such	 as	 trust	 in	
government,	procedural	fairness	and	an	independent	judiciary)	are	sufficient	to	protect	citizens	
from	unjustified	state	 interference’.	Thus,	he	concludes,	 in	 the	case	of	restrictions	 imposed	on	
liberty	by	measures	such	as	control	orders,	it	would	seem	the	presence	of	a	statutory	bill	of	rights	
in	Australia	could	‘have	a	significant	effect	on	how	appeal	court	judges	come	to	interpret	the	right	
to	liberty’	(Hardy	2011:	7).	Conversely,	he	shows	how,	in	determining	the	semantic	breath	of	anti‐
terror	legislation	and	deciding	whether	it	is	intended	to	be	a	punitive	regime,	a	statutory	bill	of	
rights	might	prove	less	effective,	given	‘the	near	identical	judicial	interpretation	of	the	Australian	
and	UK	control	order	regimes	on	these	two	points’	(Hardy	2011:	8).		
	
Indeed,	 the	 reticence	of	UK	courts	 to	challenge	 the	broad	drafting	of	anti‐terror	 legislation	or	
determine	that	punishment	is	a	purpose	of	the	control	orders	regime	may	suggest	there	would	
be	 little	point	 introducing	 legislation	 similar	 to	 the	UK	Human	Rights	Act	 in	Australia.	 In	 that	
respect,	Ewing	and	Tham	(2008)	have	commented	on	the	futility	of	the	UK	Act,	observing	that	
British	 courts	 largely	 remain	 deferential	 to	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 parliament,	 and	 display	 only	 a	
diluted	 commitment	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 which	means	 they	 have	 had	 a	 correspondingly	weak	
commitment	 to	 the	 substance	 of	 human	 rights.	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 argue	 Ewing	 and	
Tham,	British	courts	have	acted	only	as	an	irritant	rather	than	an	obstacle	to	the	government’s	
counterterrorism	policies,	which	leads	them	to	conclude	there	is:	
	
…	a	strong	lingering	sense	of	deference	by	the	courts	to	the	political	branches,	in	
the	sense	that	the	centre	of	gravity	on	the	Bench	appears	at	the	present	time	to	be	
tolerant	and	accepting	of	measures	that	would	have	been	regarded	inconceivable	
restraints	 on	 liberty	 at	 the	 time	 the	 HRA	 [Human	 Rights	 Act]	 was	 introduced.	
(Ewing	and	Tham	2008:	692)	
	
More	recently,	the	Justice	and	Security	Act	2013	(UK)	has	been	regarded	by	many	as	representing	
a	 significant	 challenge	 to	 the	 (unwritten)	 British	 constitution,	 civil	 liberties,	 and	 due	 process	
rights,	including	rights	to	minimum	disclosure	in	closed	proceedings	(Martin	2014a;	Martin	and	
Scott	Bray	2013;	Martin,	Scott	Bray	and	Kumar	2015).	And,	in	other	jurisdictions	where	formal	
provision	 is	 made	 for	 human	 rights	 in	 statutes	 or	 other	 legal	 instruments,	 the	 events	 of	 11	
September	 2001	 and	 its	 aftermath	 continue	 to	 cast	 doubt	 on	 the	 genuine	 commitment	 of	
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governments	 to	 observe	 human	 rights	 norms.	 Hence,	 notwithstanding	 protections	 afforded	
Canadian	citizens	under	the	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms,	research	in	that	country	has	shown	
how	contemporary	protest	policing	methods,	for	example,	have	involved	‘the	systematic	violation	
of	 constitutional	 protections	 against	 arbitrary	 arrest	 and	 detention	 […]	 as	well	 as	 protection	
against	abusive	searches’	(Fortin	et	al.	2013:	41).	
	
In	the	US,	too,	commentators	have	argued	the	Uniting	and	Strengthening	America	by	Providing	
Appropriate	Tools	Required	to	Intercept	and	Obstruct	Terrorism	Act	of	2001	(USA	PATRIOT	Act)	is	
a	source	of	human	rights	incursions	and	constitutional	breaches.	Indeed,	 it	has	been	observed	
that	over	the	past	decade	or	so	the	US	Supreme	Court	has	deployed	the	Fourth	Amendment	to	the	
US	Constitution,	 ‘right	of	 the	people	 to	be	secure	 in	 their	persons,	houses,	papers,	 and	effects,	
against	unreasonable	searches	and	seizures’,	contrary	to	the	protection	of	basic	rights.	In	the	case	
of	 Atwater	 v	 City	 of	 Lago	 Vista,	 for	 instance,	 ‘the	 majority	 five	 determined	 that	 the	 arrest,	
handcuffing	and	detention	in	cells	of	the	appellant	while	being	charged	with	the	misdemeanour	
of	 driving	 with	 children	 unrestrained	 by	 seat	 belts,	 did	 not	 offend	 the	 Fourth	 Amendment’	
(Churches	2013:	67).	
	
Conversely,	a	US	federal	judge	recently	ruled	that,	although	the	First	Amendment	does	not	protect	
the	right	to	take	photos	or	record	videos	of	police,	it	would	protect	the	right	if	filming	is	done	in	
the	spirit	of	protest	(Mock	2016).	This	is	a	decision	that	is	in	line	with	prior	proposals	in	California	
to	 protect	 citizens	 who	 record	 or	 photograph	 police	 actions,	 without	 obstructing	 them	 from	
performing	their	duties,6	but	out	of	step	with	later	plans	 in	Arizona	to	make	it	 illegal	to	shoot	
close‐up	videos	of	police	on	the	basis	it	would	put	officers	in	danger	by	distracting	them	while	
engaging	with	suspects.7	More	recently,	a	group	of	40	documentary	film‐makers	wrote	an	open	
letter	 to	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 after	 it	 was	 revealed	 citizen	 journalists	 who	 filmed	
shootings	of	black	people	by	police	were	subsequently	harassed	and	targeted	by	law	enforcement	
agencies	who	are	clearly	intent	on	supressing	footage,	intimidating	witness,	controlling	stories,	
and	obscuring	 instances	of	police	brutality	and	other	unjust	activity	(Lartey	2016).	 It	has	also	
been	revealed	that	police	departments	across	the	US	have	collectively	spent	US$4.75	million	on	
software	tools	designed	to	monitor	the	locations	of	protestors	and	social	media	hashtags	used	by	
activists	(Dwoskin	2016).	In	contrast	to	arguments	about	digital	technologies	and	social	media	
giving	rise	to	a	democratic	levelling	of	the	surveillance	hierarchy	(see	Martin	2015b:	208‐211),	
these	 developments	 illustrate	 clearly	 the	 lengths	 to	 which	 the	 state	 in	 seemingly	 open	 and	
democratic	societies	is	prepared	to	go	to	monitor,	control	and,	ultimately,	silence	protest.	
	
Similar	things	have	occurred	in	some	Australian	jurisdictions.	For	instance,	in	New	South	Wales,	
police	have	so‐called	‘sneak	and	peek’	powers	like	those	contained	in	the	USA	PATRIOT	Act,	which	
authorise	 entry	 to	 a	 subject	 premises	without	 the	 occupier’s	 knowledge	 (Martin	 2010:	 164).	
Police	use	of	surveillance	techniques	such	as	this,	as	well	as	other	secret	procedures,	means	their	
powers	are	increasingly	reminiscent	of	those	formerly	reserved	for	agents	working	within	the	
security	 intelligence	 community.	 Moreover,	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	 government	 recently	
introduced	 measures	 aimed	 at	 ‘criminalising	 dissent’	 (Martin	 2017),	 subjecting	 anti‐mining	
protestors	 to	 possible	 jail	 terms	 of	 seven	 years	 for	 locking	 onto	mine	 equipment	 (Robertson	
2016).	Similar	events	have	also	taken	place	during	protest	policing	in	the	UK	(Gilmore,	Jackson	
and	Monk	2016).	
	
Conclusion	
Over	recent	years,	there	has	been	a	tendency	for	politicians	to	act	with	impunity	when	enacting	
laws	relating	to	populist	issues	involving	claims	of	threats	to	national	security	or	public	safety,	
such	 as	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 counterterrorism,	 organised	 crime,	 and	 immigration	 and	 border	
protection.	 Instead,	 however,	 our	 elected	 representatives	 ought	 to	 act	 responsibly	 and	 with	
restraint,	especially	when	the	laws	they	make	contain	substantial	departures	from	established	
legal	principles	and	practice.	Notwithstanding	arguments	about	the	relative	merits	of	introducing	
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a	bill	of	rights	in	Australia,	departing	from	normal	court	processes	and	legal	doctrine	should	be	
accompanied	 by	 appropriately	 robust	 safeguards	 and	 protections	 to	 mitigate	 any	 potential	
unfairness	that	may	be	suffered	by	citizens	and	non‐citizens	alike	when	legal	secrecy	threatens	
liberty.	
	
That	is	why,	for	instance,	recommendations	pertaining	to	the	use	of	criminal	intelligence	in	the	
control	of	serious	organised	crime	include	the	use	of	special	advocates	to	represent	the	interests	
of	accused	persons,	and	a	minimum	disclosure	requirement	enabling	accused	persons	to	know	
the	substance	or	 ‘gist’	of	allegations	made	against	 them	so	as	 to	enable	 them	to	give	effective	
instruction	 to	 challenge	 those	 allegations	 (see	 Martin	 2014a).	 However,	 these	 measures	 are	
themselves	contentious	and	subject	to	debate	regarding	the	de	facto	procedural	protection	they	
afford	persons	accused	of	criminal	activity.	Problems	with	special	advocates	include	that	they	‘are	
gravely	 hampered	 by	 the	 rules	 which	 severely	 restrict	 communications	 between	 the	 special	
advocate	 and	 the	 party	 they	 “represent”	 once	 the	 closed	material	 has	 been	 served’	 (Tomkins	
2011:	 218).	Moreover,	while	minimum	 disclosure	 requirements,	 such	 as	 knowing	 the	 gist	 or	
essence	of	allegations	made	against	accused	persons,	may	inject	a	degree	of	basic	fairness	into	
closed	hearings,	if	that	is	accompanied	by	curial	control	of	fairness,	it	offends	the	equality	of	arms	
principle,	which	assumes	‘the	parties	in	court	should	be	armed	with	equal	weaponry,	and	that	the	
judge	should	keep	equidistant	from	them’	(Churches	2010:	29‐30).	
	
Finally,	although	the	courts	have	responsibility	for	administering	law,	ultimate	responsibility	for	
making	law	rests	with	parliamentarians	who,	 in	democratic	systems,	seek	to	secure	power	by	
winning	votes.	And,	while	the	idea	of	post‐democracy	(discussed	at	the	beginning	of	this	article)	
may	 limit	 political	 participation	 to	 periodic	 voting	 in	 elections—producing	 citizens	 who	 are	
‘reduced	 to	 the	 role	 of	 manipulated,	 passive,	 rare	 participants’	 (Crouch	 2004:	 21)—recent	
populist	uprisings	in	the	US	(the	election	of	Trump)	and	the	UK	(Brexit)	demonstrate	that	should	
not	be	taken‐for‐granted.	 Indeed,	 these	events	signal	not	only	 the	widespread	disillusionment	
with	a	corrupt	political	elite,	but	could	also	herald	‘the	removal	of	some	fundamental	supports	of	
democracy	and	therefore	a	parabolic	return	to	some	elements	characteristic	of	pre‐democracy’	
(Crouch	 2004:	 22).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 present	 discussion,	 one	 substantive	 consequence	
mentioned	by	Crouch	(2004:	23)	is	a	return	to	prominence	of	the	state’s	role	as	policeman	and	
incarcerator,	which	has	certainly	escalated	since	September	2001,	and	seems	likely	to	continue	
as	 politicians	 tap	 into	 an	 unremitting	 culture	 of	 fear	 to	 justify	 the	 increased	 use	 of	 secret	
provisions	and	other	exceptional	legal	measures	under	the	pretext	of	ensuring	community	safety	
and	crime	control.	That	they	might	do	so	with	disregard	for	democratic	principles,	citizen	rights,	
and	the	rule	of	law,	serves	only	to	reinforce	Lord	Acton’s	well‐known	remark	regarding	power’s	
tendency	to	corrupt.8	
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